Behind these different suggestions is the implication that central bankers will respond systematically and, hence, predictably to the different incentives embodied in these alternative programs of monetary control. If the incentives ar'e changed, so the theory goes, better policy decisions will be made. This paper focuses directly on the theoretical and empirical suppor't for the claim that different incentives induce policymakem's to choose different monetars' growth rates. This paper' does nor advocate a particular' set of incentives or form of organization for the central bank. Rather, it merely points out that the choices of monetary policymakers depend, as all choices do. upon the set of incentives the individual r:onfr'onts.
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A verfication of this proposition is sought by examining the behavior of the Bank of England over the period from, roughly, 1700 to 1930. This period, which encompasses two significant changes in the incentives facing England's central hankers, provides support for' the view that policyrnakers, like other individuals, respond predictably to changes in the cost-reward circumstances facing them.
WHAT DISTINGUISHES CENTRAL BANKERS?
The centm'al hanker is the pem'son lot' gr'oupt holding the enfom'ceable rght to control the quantity of nominal money balances in circulatiori,' This right is valuatle. Whoever' holds it can, among other things, mater'ially influence the rate of inflation and the flow of profits from money cm'eation iseigriior'agel, as well as the present value of the right itself'.
WHY THE BANK OF ENGLAND?
The Bank of England presents an interesting case in studying the etTect of different incentives on the behavior of centi-al hanker's. There are two reasons for this. First, the original om'ganization of the Barth differed from its modern couriterparis in one fundamental respect: the Bank of England was a privately-owned-for'-profit central hank from its inception in 1694 until the 1 More precisely, they control the issuance of "high-powered money" or base money. Since the long-run link between base money and the transaction balances of the public (money) is so close, the paper treats the right to control base money as synonymous with the right to control money. See Balbach (1981) ; Johannes and Rasche (1979) .
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early 1930s. Further, the Bank was immersed in a set of institutional arrangements that related the wealth of the Bank's owners inversely to the rate of inflation. This paper shows that the costs and benefits of varying monetary gr'owth rates were different for' England's private for'-profit Lentral banker's than those typically taken into account by modern centn'al bankers.
2 Consequently, a different monetary growth r'ate emem'ged.
A second reason for' studying this particular case is that contr'ol of the money supply by the Bank's owners was interrupted from 1793 to 1821, when the goyer'nment seized the Bank's monetary control function. For the purposes of this paper', the inter'ruption is important because it allows a contrast of monetary growth outcomes produced by certain identifiable changes in the incentive str'ucture, while other important institutional factors m'emained r'oughly constant.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HANK OF ENGLAND: 1694-1832
Pr'ior to 1694, England's money supply consisted mainly of coins. These coins were contr'olled by the gover'nment thr'ough regulation of the mint.
The coins wer'e in a continually bad state because the populace persisted in clipping, sweating, filing, washing and boring them. Further, the government r'esor'ted to pm'ogressive debasement in the form of frequent recoinages, a practice that was particularly pronounced during the reigns of Henry VIII and Edwar'd VI.Ĩ n some cases, the government expropriated monetary wealth outright. In 1640, Char'les I closed the London Mint and confiscated the funds of private citizens that had been stored them'e for' safekeeping. Later', in 1672, Charles II expr'opriated funds deposited with the Treasury by London goldsmiths. 4 Charles finally acknowledged one-half the debt, but the promise to pay was never kept. Payments, at the rate of 6 percent, were made only during the period 1677-83. Charles explained the reason for his action as follows: Whereas since therime on our happy RestorationWe have been involved in great Forreigne Warrs as well for the Safety of our Government as the vindication on the Rights and Privileges of our Subjects, In the prosecution whereof we have been constreyned for some years past, contrary to our Inclinacions, to postpone the paymenn of mhe moneys due from us to and expropriations, the inter'est rates demanded for long-term loans to the Crown contained a substantial pr'emium
Establishment of the Bank
William's war with France was a costly affair. When additional hinds were required in 1694. a proposal that twice pr'eviously had been put forwar'd by William Paterson was adopted in the W~'sand Means Act of thaI year. The Act pr'ovided that those who subscnhed for arid towards the r'aising and payirig into the r'eceipt of the Exchequerthe said sum oftwelve hundred thousand pounds par't of the sum of tifteen hundr'ed thousand pounds were to constitute jointly the Company of fEc Bank of England.'
The loan was a perpetuity, paying inter'est at the rate of 8 per'cent. This was considerably below the interest r'ates that previously had been clìar'ged the Crown. The subscriber's, however', received additional rights to 11 form a joint stock banking company, 21 deal in bills of exchange, gold and silver, 3) gr'ant advances on security, and 41 issue promissory notes tr'ansfer'able by endorsement in an amount not exceeding the Bank's capital These tennis apparently were very attr'actiye. The entir'e loan was subscribed within 12 days. Every subseveral Goldsmiths and other upon Taltys struck , And although the present Posture of Ouratfaires cannot reasonably spare so greame a sum as must be applied to the satisfaction of those debts, Yet considering the great difficulty which very many of our Loving Subjects (who putt their moneys into the hands of those Goldsmiths and others from whom we received it) doe at present Lye under, almost to their utterruine for want of their said moneys. We have rather chose out ot our princely care and compassion towards Our people, to suffer in Our owne Atfaires than that our loving subjects should want soe reasonable a Reliefe. Bisschop (1967) , p. 48. Incidentally, tallys were pieces of wood upon which government indebtedness was recorded. The government issued taltys when it borrowed from individuals. Goldsmiths regularly accepted these tatlys and credited the accounts of the depositors. 'Homer (1977) , p. 126. Both loans were of 1 million pounds. The first was a life annuity paying interest of 10 percent until 1700 and 7 percent thereafter on a semitontine basis (surviving subscribers split one-half the proceeds due decedent subscribers). The second loan paid interest at the rate of 14 percent. 'Bisschop, p.74, and Clapham (1958), vol. I, pp. 16-20 . T Bisschop, pp. 70-71, and Macleod (1897), pp. 773 and 776. The Bank employed three methods of accounting for the transaction accounts ("running cash") of its depositorsand these methods define how the balances were transferred in the exchange process. The methods were by "Notes payable to Bearer, to be endorsed," by "Books or Sheets of Paper, wherein their Account to be entered," or by "Notes to persons to be accomptable." The first method was the forerunner of central bank notes. The third wasessentially equivalent to a present-day checking account. The second was much like modern passbook accounts, See Clapham, vol. 1, p. 21. scriber became a shar'eholden' of the Batik to the extent of his subscr'iption, and all or any fraction of his share could be sold to other's. 5
The Bank opened for business on 10 1t is interesting to note that an official (established by law) gold standard was not enforced in England at this time. The Bank's commitment to redeem its notes at a fixed price in terms of gold was not foisted upon the Bank by the government. Rather, this was a voluntary contract established by the Bank with its customers. England's official gold standard was not established until 1821 (more than 100 years later) and then only as a result of the Bank's insistence, ''Clapham, vol. 1, , Act 7 Anne, C.7, provides "thaI during the continuance of the said corporation of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, it shall noi be lawful for any body poitic or corporate whatsoever, created or to be created (other than said Governor and Company of the Bank of England), or for any other persons whatsoever, united or to be united in covenants, or partnership, exceeding the number of six persons, in that part of Great Britain called England, to borrow, owe, or take up any sum or sums of money on their bills or notes payable at demand. or at a less time then six months from borrowing thereof," issue was also united to the same ar'ea. However', Bank of England notes were made legal tender' at this time. ' 4 This legislation provided legal force to the practice that hadl already been adopted by other banks of maintaining their reserves in the for'm of Bank of Englanìd nones.
The Government Steps In: 1793-1821
'h'h,e Napoleonic Wars between England arid l"n'ance began in 1793.~41thithe exception of a minion' truce, th,e war continued until Napoleon's abdication on April 6, 1814.'' c;overnn,en,t demands from the Bank for financing n'ose substantially dur'inig the war. Of cour'se, the Bank's contt'act with, its depositor's to r'edeen, its notes at a fixed price in, ter'ms of gold got in the way of the gover'nment's inter'est 2tnd, on l"ebr'uarv 26, 1797, the King and Pr'ivv Cor,rncil or'der'ed the Bank to strspend specie pa~'niientsã suspension that was to last for' more than, 20~'ear's,D tmr'inig the suspension, control ob the nioney supply, whicl, had rested with, the Batik's owner's, was largely usurped liv t he goven'rime nit. C haphari~notes n hat '11w minutes ot the Court and those of the Cor~irrnmtneof t'r'etsttt'v ate tuIl ot ......r'eqttests lor'help fr'on, Per'ce~'al. ar'nnl of' the Bank's r'elortanrn lion ir,van'i:rh,ir,inr',-ninin'sn'crlent,''
The Bank aopar'ennlv arqoiesced because of an 'understanding. a genitlenian,s understanding -, .no (10 this business ar,d to do it in the way most corfl'enien,t to th,e 'l'r'easnrry.''( ,n'en tl~etransfer' of n1onr~tan' con ttol to I he go~'en'nwent. it is, perI~aps, riot sutpi'isitlg that the Bar,k's Board! of UIn'ectol's bera,',,e unusually lackadaisical in their'attenlion, to duties. As a result of absenteeism, the Rank Count expet'iet~red difficulty ml nraintain,ing a quorur~i . better's were sent to a tiumber of di'ecton's that ''pointedly asked 'wI ten tl,eir atten lance could I Ic deper~ded upon '' for ''too much of the business had 13 8isschop, p. 198. 4 Andreades (1924) 
Return to Private Control
The suspension played an importanit role in the governments effort to wr'est contr'ol of the money supply fn'oni the Bank. Ini tl,e atisence of suspension, ''control'' of the stock of nioniey would biave nieant little to the go~'er'nmenitsince the n'equir'enient to n'edeenr notes at a fixed price in, ten'nrs of specie eventually' would brave land did dun'ing 1790-961 placed arl effective conistrainit on niote issue.
'l'b,e public was nlever keer~on the sus pension, arid the Banik made thus the political issue in its fight to r'egaiii corfi n'ol of the money sup ri 1 ,~'•I mu Oc totier of 1797, six months after' it was ordered to suspend payments.
tI~e Batik indicated that in could ''with safety n'esunnue its accustonied functionis I pavnient of speciel, if the political circr.nmstances of the country did) not n'enden' it iniexpedienut.'' 2°T he Bank's repon't was vin'tuallv ignoredi hw governmen,t. In June of 1810, th,e ''Report fron,, the Select Conrnuttee on the High Pn'ice of Bullion,'' r'ecommen,ded to Pan'lianient that the resumption of specie payments at the old par begin within tvvo ear-s. The issue was not even taken up for discussion, until Juhv of the following year. 2 n A vote on the recor,,n,endatior, \\'as taken, in the House of Con,,n,,ons in, 1811. The House voted 180 to 45 against the issue.
On its own in,itiatiye, the Bank began pan'tiah n'esumption of specie payments for' ndines ofs pounds dir less in Jar,r,narv of 1817. Early in 1819, hoìvever, Parhian,en,t r'equired the Ban,k to dliscontinue the practiceH Parliamerit had promised on the diflen'en,t occasionis to eventuatly retttr'ni to specie pavments~hut continuedl to drag its feet on fixing a dhate. Finally',~iniJuly 2, 1819, the I Louse of Comniions passed an act permitting the n'esumption of cash payments bullion, and coirlI after' May' 1, 1822. At flue request of the Bank, this (late evetitoally' was nnovedl for'war'd to May 1, 1821,2.1 SOME IMPOHTANT OBSERVATIONS 'l'hen'e,ar'ea nunthier' of impon'fanit poinuts to dr'aw front, the pn'evnous discussion, in, anuah~zinignb,e incenl- tives faced] by the central bankers. First, given, the one exception rioted. the righut to control tl,e money supply was lucid privateh\'. This right, mu the form ofownuership shares in the Bank. was tr'adled in an organuizedl market Any' expected ch,anuges in, the ftrtur'e profits (if the Ban'nk would be reflected by chaniges in the price of Bank shares and would immediately affect the wealth oh Bank ownen's.
Second. the owner's of the Batik had loar,ed considen'abhe sums to tb,e go~'en'timentin perpetuity at fixed r'ates of inter'est. By 1743, thie sum was well in excess di! nuinle n,uillioni pounds.
Finahhv, the Bank's contract with, its ctnstonrers tc r'edeem its notes at a fixedh pr'ice iru ternus of gold was a voluntary ar'n'anugement. An official Iestablished liv lawl gold stanud]an'd did riot exist in Englanudh r.nn,til 1821. In, fact, the gold standhard came about lan'geh' as a result of the Bank's conitiniltous prods to an unwilling Piu'liamerit.
'I'he following discusses how this unique incentive structur'e faced by' England's central bankers in,-fluenced the monietarv gn'owthu rate,
THE PROFITS FROM THE RIGHT TO CONTROL MONEY
Like the r'iglut to control thie production of any cowmodhitv, the right no control the lirodluctionu (if money is valuable. The central bank, at the cost of a few cents won-ti, of paper and ink, can produce a $100 bill br a 100-pound niotel that car, be exchanged in flue market for $100 won'tI, of n'esou tees.
The flow of Profits
The cen,tt'al bank ir,trodu ces money into circulation b~'exchanuginug units of moruey which it pn'ints i for comn rodities. 'l'h,ese (:o r,,modi ties may tie eitb,er real or financial assets. Since the bian,k buys these assets at nn,an-ket pn'ices, the expectedh flow of ruonuinal profits gerue.r'ated by the purchase of the assets is equal to the nominal in,ten'est rate times tl,e pr-ice of the assets pun'-chased. This is equivalenu t to tlie nominual in Uores t rate nuoltiphied by the qoanu tiny of nuoney exchanged for thue assets. 'l'hue flow (if neal revenue is sin, ph' the n,omir,al flow divided liv the price level Ii X Nt:fil.
Sinure we am'e interested in n'elatirug the hiar,k's neal r'eyetlue llo\\' to thue r'ate of money pn-odtrrtior~,account mnst he taker, (if the fact that, at highen' m'ates of money prodhnctioti I higluer n'ates of inflatior~I,people will wan~t to hold hess of their-wealth in the form of real purchasing power fM/Pb. Other things unchanged. the flow of real revenue wouhd decline at higher-rates of money growth because M/P declines. Even thoughu M is n-ising, the price level rises fasten-. However, other things an'e not unchanged. Faster money growth increases the n'ate of inflation and this raises the nominal inten'est rate hI.
Faster money production exer'ts two opposing fon'ces on the bank's real revenue. One force tends to reduce revenue, while the other tends to incn-ease reyenue. In general, there is a unique rate of money growth (and rate of inflationl that will maximize the flow of real revenue.
A Simple Example
'rahle 1 presents a hypothetical example n-elating different rates of inflation or rates of monetan-v growthb, ii, to the public's demand for real purchasing power, Nt/P. In order to facilitate the calculation of the nate of inflation that nuaximizes the hiank's revenue flow, suppose that the public knows the n-ate of inflation with centaintv iextn'eme national expectationsl, that changes in the nuonetany growth r'ate affect onE' the rate of inflation and the public's desire for' n'eal purchasing power-hut no othuen' n-cal variables, that the cost of producing nonuinal units of nuuoney is zen-o so revenue and profits are identicaL, that n-cal outpn.nt and population are stationary, that the real interest rate is 10 percent, and that the nominal interest n-ate is equal to the sum of the real inter'est rate and rate of inflation Ii = r + 'tn.
The numbers in the first two columns of table I indicate that, as the rate of inflation rises Ifalls), the public's demand for real purchasing power falls rises). The third column indicates the nonumnal rate of inten-est at the various rates of inflation. The fourth column indicates the profit stneam at the diffen-ent rates of inflation.
As the rate of inflation falls ftom very high rates, the bank's profit from inflation initially rises because people choose to hold a greater amount ofreal purchasing power. Reducing the rate of inflation increases total profits up to a point (1.80 real goods per unit of tinue in this example), after which further reductions in the rate ofinflation cause profits to fall. In this example, the profit-maximizing rate of inflation (monetary growth rate), which is the one the centr-ah bankers will choose, is 20 percent.' 4
ThE BANK OF ENGLAND'S UNIQUE CONSTRAINTS

The flow of Profits
Among other things, the above r-esuht depends upon the particular-set of operating n-ules the bank faces. Apart from the particular assumptions expressed above, the foregoing example does not constrain the bank in anyway. If additional rules were imposed, the pn'oflt function may change. As a result, the central bankers would be confronted with different incentives, causing them to select a different monetary gr-owth rate.
The Bank of Engtand was founded on the condition that tire stockholders gr'ant a substanutial loan to the ' 4 Since A " i x (M/P) (r + ,rffM!P), real profits are maximized when
where nm = the elasticity of demand ror real purchasing power with respect to the rate of inflation. When r = 0, this result reduces to -I which is the familiar result obtained by others. See Friedman (1953), pp. 251-62; Friedman (1971), pp. 846-56; and Bailey (1956), pp. 93-110. government at a fixed rate of interest. By 1743, that loan amounted to almost 10 nuillion pounds. At the point when these loans were made to the government, the interest rate charged was below the market rate. Recall the 1694 loan at 8 percent when the man-ket rate on long-term loans to the Crown was 14 pen-cent.l This subsidized loan n-ate is a paynuent made by the Bank to the goven'nment fon' thue lease rights to the production of money. The night was neven' granted to the Bank in perpetuity. Rather, as indicated above, the Bank's charter came up for-review per-iodicahly.
'Fhe cost to the Bank of its government loan depends upon the man-ket rate of interest. If the coupon rate is c and the amount loaned is L, the nominal value of the lease payment pen-unit of time is hi -cbL. The real value is the nominal amount divided by the price level, hi-ehIJP. The higher the nominal n-ate of interest, i, relative to the coupon rate, c, the larger the cost of the lease to the Bank.
An additional constnaint is relevant. The quantity of notes the Bank could issue was n-estricted by law to an anuount less than or equal to the capital invested by stockholder's. Since the capital repr-esented the loan to the governnuent, M must be less than or equal to L. Given this constraint, the Bank's owners will choose NI = L because the flow of real pr-ofit is highest in this case, othen-thuings the same hsee inset-tI. Consequently, thue Bank's pr-ofit is sinuply the coupon n-ate ear-ned on the loan, c, tinues the loan which, is equal to the quantity of notes issued, MI, divided by the price level, P. Table 2 illustrates the effect of this set of rules on the pnufit-nuaxinuizing n-ate of inufiation for the Bank. The fin-st thn-ee columns of table 2 sinuphy n-epn-oduee the first thur-ce columns of table t. Column 4 calculates the n-cal profits of the Bank under-the new set of r-ules whem-e the coupon nate, c, is assumed to be 10 pen-cent. Note that profits an-c n,aximized at a zeno rate of inflation rather than the 20 pen-cent n-ate obtained previously.'
5
It is in the interest of Bank owners to inform the public of their-intention to maintain a relatively low inflation n-ate. Demand for the Bank's pn-oduct does not rise until the anticipated rate of inflation declines. This evennually will n-esult from the Bank's policy of maintairung a relativelv low monetany growth rate. The owner-s of the Bank. however. chose to hur-ry the adjustment of expectations by "man-keting" their' hank notes in a par-tictnhan' way.
In nuar-keting its notes. the Bank guan-anteed its custonren's a low n-ate of price inflation. This guar-antee took the form of a contract to redeem Bank notes at a fixed price ha fixed weight of gold). 'The contn-act can be thought of as insun-ance against the overissue of Bank notes, because it pledged the original investnuent of the Bank's stockholden-s as sun-ety fon' meeting the contn-act.'°If bank notes were issued in such quanutity as to 25 This result is completely general as tong as the demand tor real purchasing power is inversely related to the rate of inflation. In this case, dR
Since the derivative of the profit function with respect to the rate of inflation is negative, it does not pay the Bank to generate an in(Iation by continuously expanding M and, of course, the constraint that Mz4L will eventually become binding. Given that profit maximization requires M = L from expression I, a deflation would not benefit the Bank because it would require M to fall below L. As a result, the Bank will choose a zero rate of inflation. In addition, the Bank's owners tended to be net monetary creditors as a class and this further reduced their incentive to inflate.
There were about 1,300 original subscribers to the Bank stock. Many of them were London businessmen who were "linked sneeringly with the rather ill-famed money-lending scriveners." Others were Gentlemen and Esquires, "people who.., live idly as 'gentlemen'." See Clapham, vol. 1, pp. 273-89. '°"Thatdouble event, (I) a low identification cost to everyone about the intermediate commodity and (2) specialist-experts who provide quality assurance and information more cheaply than novices can provide for themselves, explains the use of a tow identification cost commodity as a general intermediary medium of exchange-money. It permits purchase of information from tower cost sources, a cost reduction that exceeds the added cost of using an intermediary good for indirect exchange." Alchian. pp. 117-18.
The Role of Speck Payments: A Contract for Price Level Stability
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cause their nuuam-ket li~ceiru ter-ms of gold to fall hielow thue pn'ice pn'onnuised hv tlue Banuk, people wotrld arhuitn'age flue differ-eruce liv tn-adimug gold for notes mu the n,uar'ket at the how pr-ice aruh exchanging tlue nuo tes for' gold at the Bank for thue huighuer-pn'nce. mu tlue process.
wealthu would hue tr'anusfer'n'ed away tr'oflu stockholden's to those enugaginug mu thue. ar-hi tr'age-'blue guaramutee was hehievahuhe hiecaitse custonnen-s kruew thuat stockhuohden-s wot rId lose wealth if the Banuk over'iss ued its nunites r-ehat ive to thue supply of goods mu genuer'ah aruh gold mu particular.' "Of course, the guarantee is not perfect. New gold discoveries or improvements in mining technology would cause the price of gold and Bank notes to fall in terms of, say. a standard commodity basket. However, the guarantee. while imperfect, was operational. It provided a relatively low-cost method ol metering the Bank's rate of note production and policing the guarantee.
DIFFERENT CONSTRAINTS FOR THE GOVERNMENT
t%luenu, for' all practical pun-poses. tlue goven-nnnerut took cot-itr'oI of thue nuuonuev supply mu 1793, the con,-stn-aints facinug thue decisiom,ruraken's chuarugech substantiallv, Recall tluat thue govennumuuenut did muon e.xpr-oprnate owner'shuip rights in, thue Bank outr'igbut . I lad tlue~'dorue so, it would buave beeru a clear and, possihily, politically urusavor'yl tr'am,sfer-of wealthu fn'onu stockhuo den's to tlue governrner it. The go~'en'nunuuerut , huowever', did blue ruext best thirug ir-omlu its poirut of view. It expropriated thue wealtlu of thue stockhuolder-s his' a nuor'e circuitous roirte.
VVIuen the go\'en'nrnemut took oven-, tue Banu k h tel (I a loan, wI,iclu, wluihe an asset to tiue Bank. was a liability to the go~'er'nunrerut . hru terms of thue exaruuple used hu en'e, an incn-ease mu thue nate of inflation, murn-eases tlue nuonuimual inter-est rate. i, arid inucr-eases thue Baruk's (ippor-tunitv cost of tlue governnuenut loan, Ii -'-clL/P. In effect, acceler-atirug tlue n-ate of inflation n'aised tlue lease pa\'-merit the Bank nuade to thue goven-nunuuenut.
Further-, during its period of control, thue goven-nnuuent continuously wohated the constr'ainut that the quantity of notes in cin-culation not exceed tlue capital of tlue Banuk. 'l'lue governunuuerut did riot wish to lie bound fly the sarute n'ule tluat mt believed appn-opniatc' in r-cgulaming tlue heIua~iorof the Bank's stockholders.
As a n-esult of thue differ-unit constrairuts faced fly Bank owners vs. tlue gm'er-nunuenut, we shuou Id expect to ohserve relatively low rates of nuuonetanv growth and mnufbtior, dunmug periods wluenu thue nuuonuey supph' is conutn'ohled liv thue pni~'ateowners of thue Banuk nif Engl arud arid muuor-e r'apid r-ates of nuonuetarv gr'o~vthuarid in,fiut ion dur'ing tlue periods of gover-nunuuenut conutn'ol. In addition, thue deniuand for teal pur'chuasmrug power should he lower' dun-mug the period of governtuuent eontn-cl amid the pence cif Baruk stock shoirld decline.
EVIDENCE
The Behavior of English Prices
Orue of tIne nuom'e initer'estirug pieces of e~'ideruceconeer'muimug thur efl'er.t of differ-emit incentives is England's luiston' of' inflation rlinr-imig the pen-iod of pn'i''ale nuonuenary comut nol -E nuglanu ds mu toni ev innphily was in rider private control for' alnuuost 200 yean's, amid the rate of inflation dun-mug this period "as statisricall\' imudistirignnisliahie ln'on'rn zen'o. l"n'onuu the estalihshurnerrt of' tIre I3an,k mu lt-iir4 rnmutil the hegitunuinug nif the Napoleonuic Wars in 1793 when the go\'en-nu nuiemut usurped con rtn-oh of the r noniev 5 tn pplv. the annual average r-ate of inflation itu England was .01 bier-remit. In I S2 1 after' thur Napoleonic V\'ar's, blue goven'numen it n-emit r-nuech conut n'ol of thue nuuonev so pph' to the Bamu k arid, at blue Bank's insistence, estabhished aru official gob] standard. Private conitr'oI contiruued until 1913. The I-scores for the periods 1694-1 793, 1822-1913 and 1931-82 are .145. .489 and 6.62. respectively,
Additional Evidence
blue abio~'edata r-egar'dirug tiue luiston' of English in rilation are consistent with one of thue imuuplicatiorus of the thueory, Other aspects of tlue th'reon'v can be exanurirued liv consider-mug data from,, the per-rod inuumuuediately before. chiming uric I after' the Napoleonic War's. The war-is innpon'tamir because I he t m'ansfen' of conu t r-ol of r hue nuoniev supply clueing the war was accomplished thinough a ''g-~rutreman 's in nder-stariding'' math rer I han an curtr-igh gover'nunuenut expropriation of Bank on'nuen-sluip. As a n-es nrlt, cuwner'ship shar'es in, t hue Ban ik continuech to he exchanged In' private mnudividinals, anud changes in thue value of nbuese shares alorug with, changes in the nemand for-real ptrr'chasinug power' provide ftrr-thuer-evideruce in regard no the theory,
The Alarket Price of Bank Stock
'labile 3 presents an estimate oI the effect of thur gmnver-runnenit takeover' and suspemrsiotu of specie pa\'-intents on the real pt'ire nit' Baruk stock. The estimate The Napoleonic Wars:
contr'ols for-the effect of business cycles Iproxied by aver-age annual real weekly earnings of men in full-time employment) and the interest rate, and includes a dummy variable for-the period subsequent to the suspension. The coefficients of the business cycle proxy and the inter-est n-ate are significant and have the expected sign. The coefficient of h)~is negative and significant. Its magnitude inuphies that the government takeover-caused the real pn-ice of Bank stock to fall "pen-manently" by about 11 percenut.'°In short, the goven-nment chose a n-ate of inflation that was inconsisterut with maximizing the real flow of Bank profits (from all soun-ces) and this was reflected in the price of Bank stock.
The price of the stock did not rebut-n to its oniginal level when monetary control was returned to the stockholder-s in 1819.30 
Disgruntled Stockholders
Understandably, the stockholders were restive during the suspension. In 1801, Alexander Allardyce, 29 The estimates are adjusted for first-order autocorretation. They were checked for second-order autocorretation with the result that Rho 2 was insignificant. iODuring fhe later part of the suspension, various moves to resume specie payments were afoot. As earty as 1810, the Buttion Report advocated a return to specie payments in 1812. In addition, the Bank had begun a partial resumption in 1817, and in 1819 Partiamenl finally committed itselt to a specific date br resumption. For purposes of rhe following test, I terminate the period in 1818, the year prior to Parliament's decision to return control to the Bank. "See Sinclair (1803), pp. 22-48.
"The t-score = 10.78. spokesman for' the critics, moved that a complete accounting of the Bank's financial condition be presented to thue stockholder-s so that the Court might "declar-e a dividend of the whole profits, the Charges of Management only excepted, as the Law directs."
Real dividend payments, inclusive of bonuses, did not men-ease during the suspension and the n-eah value of Bank stock declined. These two faclots along with interest-free loans made by the Bank to the government must have appear-ed to critics as a thinly veiled expropriation of wealth: tm ' They no dotnbt recognized the spin-it of Chan-hes II lurking in the goven-nment.
Prices
As was the case for-the mon-c extended period discirssed above, the n-ate of inflation is indistinguishable fi-om zer-o (see table 41 in theyears immediately preceding the gover-nment takeover and those following nesumption of specie payments in 1821, In contnast, the price level rose significantly fat an aven-age annual rate "Clapham, vol. 2, p. 40. "~In 1799, when the market rate of interest stood at 5,07 percent on bong-term securities, the Bank made a "loan" to the government of 3 million pounds interest-free for six years. The present value of this gift was, roughly, 770.000 pounds. In addition, when the loan came due in March of 1806, the government asked that the loan be renewed until a point in lime six months after a "Definitive Peace."
The government offered to pay 3 percent interest, At the time, the tongterm interest rate was considerably higher and 3 percent consobs were setting at about a 40 percent discount. 
The Real Value of Bank Money
'l'he tlueon-v implies that thu. demand for real putchasing powen will fath if the guarantee regarding t)ue lou. rate of inliatioru is bnDken.'" The issue of private vs government control of the money tock might seem to be a red herrnng since the money supply and prrce bevel always rrse durrng wars This however was not the case in two previous instances Durrng the Seven Years War (1755-63), the government drd not tamper wrth the Bank s control over the money supply, and the mean rates of growth rn money and prices were 2.94 and 1 18 percent respectively. Neither of these magnitudes dnflers sngnrtrcanfty from zero Similarly, durrng the War of Jenkins Ear (1739-43) the mean rates of growth in money and prices were -1.62 and 66 percent respectively Again, nerlher of these differs srgnrfrcanfly from zero. 7 Exactly when the pubtnc became aware of a break in the trust problematical They certainly were aware of it by 1797 when the government ordered the Bank to suspend specie payments The data, however suggest an earlrer date Price began ri mg rapidly in 1790 and shortly afterwards, the public began arbitraging the dnfference between the price of gold in terms ot notes at the Bank and its price in the foreign market The Banks bullion account began to decline in 1791, then felt substantially rn 1792 The following Table S presents a regression that estimates th effect of the government's seizure of control over thn money supply on the demand for real purchasmn 1 power by controlling for the effect of business cycles population and the alternative cost of holding nuoney Annual population data at-c not available back to 1780 so time is used as a rough proxy to control for popula tion growth. The interest rate on 3 per-cent consohs waĩ ncluded as a measure of the alter-native cost of holdinw ealth in the fonm of money. In addition, a dunumṽ ariable is included to test fora shift in the relationshiç in the period subsequent to the government takeover'
The coefficients ofthue pnnxies fon the business eychr and population are significant and have the expectec signs. The interest n-ate proved insignificant and waẽ xcluded from the estimate. 'rhe coefficment of D 0 is negative and significant. Its magnitude inuplies that tlu demand for real put-chasing power-fell by about 12 percent when the government seized control of the Bank." 7
CONCLUSION
The above analysis suggests that decisions n-egan-dint he conutrol of money depend more on the incentives individuals face in making choices tharu din the particular individuals u.vhuo make thue chuoiee. Various methods of on-ganizing monetary contn'ol produce distiruct policy outeonues insofar as thuey confn-orut pohicynuaker-s with different inucentives, Siruce it is unclean', for exaruuple, that the inucentives confronted by-tlue policynuaker-woirld be much different if nuuoruetary con,trol were placed iru tlue hands of Congr-ess or' the Tn-easun-v itustead of tlue Board of Goverruors, it is uruclean-thuat thue adoption of eithuer of thuese alter-natives would cause a noticeable chanuge in policy. Additional n-eseant-bu along these lines may prove helpful iru suggestmrug a svstenu of incentives that will induce tlue pr-esent-day equivalents of the Court of Directors to assign the desired weights (whatever-they happen to bet to present arid futun-e consequences in reacluing decisions neganu.linug nuonetan' conti-ol. assumes the public became aware of the break in 1793 when the war with France began. ' 8 As was the case with the price of Bank stock, the demand for real purchasing power did not return to its original level when the government returned monetary control to the Bank and the guarantee was reinstated, This was tested by the same procedure as that employed in the case of the price of Bank stock. The results were the same. The coefficient of the second dummy was insignificant, indicating that it is redundant.
